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 Political legitimacy and European
monetary union: contracts,
constitutionalism and the normative
logic of two-level games
Richard Bellamy and Albert Weale
ABSTRACT The crisis of the euro area has severely tested the political authority of
the European Union (EU). The crisis raises questions of normative legitimacy both
because the EU is a normative order and because the construction of economic and
monetary union (EMU) rested upon a theory that stressed the normative value of the
depoliticization of money. However, this theory neglected the normative logic of the
two-level game implicit in EMU. It also neglected the need for an impartial and pub-
lically acceptable constitutional order to acknowledge reasonable disagreements. By
contrast, we contend that any reconstruction of the EU’s economic constitution has
to pay attention to reconciling a European monetary order with the legitimacy of
member state governance. The EU requires a two-level contract to meet this stan-
dard. Member states must treat each other as equals and be representative of and
accountable to their citizens on an equitable basis. These criteria entail that the
EU’s political legitimacy requires a form of demoicracy that we call ‘republican inter-
governmentalism’. Only rules that could be acceptable as the product of a political
constitution among the peoples of Europe can ultimately meet the required stan-
dards of political legitimacy. Such a political constitution could be brought about
through empowering national parliaments in EU decision-making.
KEY WORDS Democracy; euro crisis; legitimacy; political constitutionalism;
social contract theory
THE MAKING OF THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS
The crisis of the euro area (EA) has severely tested the political authority of the
EU. Since 2010 the EU and its members states have been forced to improvise
policies and processes to deal with the crisis, including the European Semester,
a strengthened Stability and Growth Pact, the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordina-
tion and Governance, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and
its successor in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Begg 2013;
Ioannou et al. 2015). The European Central Bank (ECB) has embarked
upon two rounds of long-term reﬁnancing operations to improve bank liquid-
ity, in effect buying sovereign debt, as well as announcing its willingness to
# 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
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5
 engage inoutright monetary transactions (OMT), a policy allegedly leading Jens
Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank, to say that this is tantamount ‘to
ﬁnancing governments by printing banknotes’ (Steen 2012). And still the pro-
spect of deﬂation looms over European economies (House of Lords 2014c:1 3
and passim).
The same conditions that gave rise to these policy imperatives have required
the EU to ﬁnd ways of supporting the governments of Greece, Ireland, Portu-
gal, Spain and Cyprus in deﬁance of the no bail-out clause of the original
monetary union (now Article 125 of the TFEU). They have resulted in the
Troika imposing restrictions on the national budgets of debtor governments,
policies that have been resisted by national parliaments and opposition move-
ments. They have strengthened anti-EU parties, with a record number of
Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected in the Euro-
pean elections of May 2014. They have provoked legal actions in national con-
stitutional courts in both creditor countries like Germany (Federal
Constitutional Court 2014a, 2014b) and debtor countries like Portugal
1
resulting in judgements that question the legitimacy of the programmes.
They have stimulated continued, and sometimes violent, demonstrations
against public expenditure austerity packages. They have entailed the installa-
tion of technocratic governments in Greece and Italy in 2012 as a way of
dealing with the inadequacies of their respective political institutions, as well
as the electoral defeat of incumbent governments in Spain and France. In
short, they have brought about a crisis of political legitimacy for the EU.
The Lisbon Treaty was widely regarded as having settled the institutional
architecture of the EU after nearly two decades of constitutional debate. The
EA crisis has reignited those issues. The new policies and processes that have
been inaugurated have changed the balance of power within the EU and
opened up questions about what ‘deep and genuine’ economic and monetary
union (EMU) requires by way of institutional change (European Commission
2012; House of Lords 2014a). In these debates, issues of normative political
legitimacy inevitably arise, because the EU is a normative order. That is to
say, the agreements that it embodies contain principles and values deﬁning
norms of behaviour for member states and EU institutions. The Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), strength-
ened through Title VIII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), together with the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, have required
member states to make progressively stronger commitments to one another in
respect ofeconomic and ﬁscal policy (Ioannou et al.2015). Those commitments
have been reinforced by the Fiscal Compact contained in the Treaty on Stab-
ility, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
(TSCG), by which member states have undertaken to ensure that national
budgets are in balance or in surplus ‘through provisions of binding force and
permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be
fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes’
(TSCG, Article 3.2). Such measures provide a set of rules and principles by
258 Journal of European Public Policy
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 reference to which policies and institutional change are justiﬁed. Resting on
agreed norms and principles, they form a political contract among member
states.
However, questions of normative legitimacy are raised by the crisis not
simply as a result of the EU’s being a normative order, but also because the
construction of EMU rested upon a set of constitutional principles that con-
tained strong – and contestable – normative assumptions. In particular, econ-
omic and monetary union was constructed according to the principles of legal
constitutionalism (Issing 2008; James 2012). Legal constitutionalism is a pol-
itical doctrine to the effect that a legitimate political regime must rest on a set
of legal rules that constrain the actions of politically responsive decision-
makers. In some versions (e.g., Dworkin [1996]) such restrictions take a
‘left liberal’ form; in others (e.g., Hayek [1979]), they take a neoliberal
form (see Bellamy [2007]). Our contention in this contribution is that the
developing political contract underlying EMU has produced restrictions on
member states with respect to their public budgets that amount to more
than simply a treaty agreement; they have given rise to a treaty agreement
underwritten by the principles of legal constitutionalism of a neoliberal
kind, indeed of a speciﬁc kind within neo-liberalism.
The tradition of political analysis that fed into the construction of the single
currency and its management is to be found in the work of thinkers associated
with the Hayekian version of constitutional liberalism (see James [2012: 6–7]).
According to this tradition, democratic governments have a tendency to ﬁscal
irresponsibility owing to politicians having incentives to buy votes through
excessive public expenditure. In seeking re-election, political representatives
are motivated to respond to the wishes of special interest groups in the short
term rather than framing legislation for the public interest in the long term. Par-
ticular manifestations of these tendencies might include the provision of price
support schemes for agriculture, the protection of domestic industry from
foreign competition, interference in controlling the terms of employment con-
tracts that can be agreed, and expenditure on public works that beneﬁt only
localized constituencies. Hayek (1979) held that, to avoid these pitfalls, states
need to be constrained by constitutional rules and mechanisms from engaging
in excessive expenditure and unduly interfering in the operations of the free
market. Behind the construction of the speciﬁc set of rules for EMU, therefore,
lay a more general set of premises concerning the character of a democratic pol-
itical order.
The problem with this construction, we argue, is that, when applied to
EMU, it neglects the normative logic of two-level games. According to this
logic, when governments make commitments to one another about their
future behaviour, they simultaneously need to be responsible and accountable
to their domestic populations in order to retain their political legitimacy.
The logic of two-level games was originally developed by Putnam (1988)t o
account for the outcome of the Bonn economic summit of 1978, and has
been subsequently applied to empirical cases ranging from security issues to
R. Bellamy and A. Weale: Contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of
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 economic diplomacy and North–South relations (Evans et al. 1993). As
Pollack (2001: 225) has pointed out, it also lies behind liberal intergovern-
mentalist accounts of EU integration such as that of Moravcsik (1998) and
Schimmelfennig (2015). However, this framework of analysis neither
implies ﬁxed preferences (Crespy and Schmidt 2014), nor does it have only
an empirical use. Beyond its empirical applications, the logic of two-
level games also has a normative interpretation (Savage and Weale 2009) pro-
viding a model by which we can evaluate the justiﬁability of constitutional
arrangements.
The neglect of the normative logic of two-level games in the construction of
EMU is compounded by a second problem within legal constitutionalism:
namely, its disregard of the existence of reasonable differences in political judge-
ment over the principles that should govern a monetary union made up of
different sovereign states, each with their own traditions of economic and mon-
etary policy. Indeed, even within the broadly neoliberal tradition of thinking
about economic constitutions, there are important differences of substance as
well as emphasis. When the conditions for continuing contestation over
policy measures and organization exists, the putative political legitimacy of
EU legal constitutionalist arrangements, such as those underlying EMU, the
SGP and the TSCG, reinforce the practical contradiction of the two-level
game implicit in the economic constitution. By contrast with this attempt to
entrench legal constitutionalism, we suggest that the design of an economic con-
stitution ought to respect the principles of political constitutionalism, with its
requirement that governments be responsive to thepublic reasoning oftheir citi-
zens within the continuing democratic conversation that makes up a political
society (Bellamy 2007).
In pursuing this argument, the contribution proceeds as follows. In the next
section we lay out the normative logic of the two-level game embodied in the
construction of EMU. According to this logic, those participating in inter-
national agreements have a dual duty: to deal fairly with one another, on the
one hand; and to be responsive and accountable to the democratic reasoning
of the people whom they represent, on the other. In acknowledging this dual
duty, they should also acknowledge that their fellow negotiators have a
similar duty in respect of their own peoples. The penultimate section indicates
why, given reasonable disagreement about the principles that should govern an
economic constitution, the legitimacy of EMU cannot be simply secured by
framing the related ﬁscal rules in legal constitutionalist terms. The long-term
legitimacy of EMU is compatible only with political constitutionalism. We con-
clude that so long as the EU remains subject to the logic of delegation implicit in
the normative logic of two-level games, EMU must remain subject to the equal
control and inﬂuence of the different member state demoi – a position we
characterize as ‘republican intergovernmentalism’. We suggest this result can
be achieved through the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policy-
making.
260 Journal of European Public Policy
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 THE NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY OF TWO-LEVEL CONTRACTS
At the centre of the issue of political legitimacy is the question of the credibility,
and consequently the justiﬁability, of the reasoning underlying the norms and
principles on which the construction of EMU is based. Yet, how might one
evaluate such credibility? We approach this question through contractarian pol-
itical theory. According to contractarian theory, political authority is to be
understood as arising from a contract to mutual advantage implicitly or expli-
citly agreed among the members of a political association. The need for political
organization can be modelled as the solution to dilemmas of collective action
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Gauthier 1986; Ostrom 1990; Weale 2013).
These dilemmas occur when unco-ordinated action by separate agents gives
rise to potential gains from co-operation, as in an agreement on weights and
measures or the rules of the road, or where unco-ordinated individual action
leads to harmful side-effects from otherwise legitimate human activity, of
which pollution and resource depletion are the obvious examples. If we think
of political associations as having a contractarian logic in this sense, then we
can address the issue of credibility by asking what conditions have to be satisﬁed
for actors to ﬁnd a contract that they can rationally support (Gauthier 1986).
The general logic of contractarian analysis can be applied not only to the
study of natural persons but also to relations between states. States can
impose harmful externalities on other states and their populations through
cross-boundary pollution, trade restrictions or population movements. They
can also fail to secure common advantages through a lack of political co-ordina-
tion. The EU has often been portrayed as a mechanism for overcoming these
problems in the international arena (Moravcsik 1993). The assumption is
that the policies that fall within the competence of the EU are in the long-
term common interest of the member states, offering Pareto improvements
over a prevailing status quo for all concerned. However, many such issues are
subject to the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma. Each member state may be
better off with an agreed policy with which all other member states comply
but with which it does not, than it would be when it complied as well, even
if all would be worse off without any agreement. Yet, if this logic is clear to
all, none would rationally comply and so the policy will either never be
agreed or will unravel over time. Thus, the fundamental problem to be solved
in any political contract between states is that of inducing credibility in
others of one’s commitment to the policy to be agreed to avoid defection
from a mutually beneﬁcial agreement. To overcome this free rider problem
requires states to be able to make credible commitments to one another
about their willingness to fulﬁl their obligations, even on those occasions
when fulﬁlling those obligations proves onerous.
ThelogicoftheN-personprisoner’s dilemma wasreﬂectedintheconstruction
of EMU. As Issing (2008: 234–6) has clearly explained, it was thought that,
because democratic competition works to create deﬁcit ﬁnancing, thereby under-
mining the long-term stability of the currency and public ﬁnances, the euro was
R. Bellamy and A. Weale: Contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of
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 designed to represent depoliticized and hence stable money. On this analysis, the
political beneﬁts of deﬁcit spending in the form of votes gained by governing
parties are enjoyed by national players, while the potential negative effects,
notably higher interest rates, are felt by all states. So, it is rational for prudent
states to seek to ensure that they do not incur the spillover effects of others’
deﬁcit spending, and they can attempt to do this by institutionalizing a no bail-
out rule. The alternative to such a rule is to leave discipline to the markets.
However,withinacurrencyunionthereisnoexchangeraterisktoanationalgov-
ernment from deﬁcit ﬁnancing, and so borrowing premiums remain low over a
periodoftimeandcreditriskbuildsup(Issing2008:193–4).Awareofthispossi-
bility,no rationalstatewouldprudentlyenterinto a currencyunionwithout a no
bail-out rule. Hence, in order for any such agreement to take place, states must
committofundingtheirownborrowing.Eachstatehastobeabletomakeacred-
ible commitment tootherstates aboutthemaximumdeﬁcits that theyarewilling
totolerateintheirpublicspendingplans.This,inshort,wastherationaleoftheno
bail-outclauseoftheMaastrichtTreaty.TheSGParosefromtherecognitionthat
theMaastrichtrulesofnobail-outandnoexitwereinsufﬁcienttopreventmember
states continuing to run excessive deﬁcits. The idea was that the scope for ﬁscal
adjustmentsamongparticipatingstateshadtobedeﬁnedonceandforall.Political
representativesatthememberstatelevelcouldstillco-ordinateﬁscalandmonetary
policy,butonlyonconditionthatthemonetarycomponentwasﬁxedexogenously
by an independent European Central Bank, the ECB, that had been deliberately
isolated from political interference (see Issing [2008: 193–5]).
When Germany in 2002 and then France and Germany in 2003 breached the
provisions of the SGP, member states within the contract of monetary union
had an incentive to strengthen monitoring and compliance even more. With
the coming of the ﬁnancial crisis, the next stage of the contractarian logic was
to embed the SGP in the European Semester, together with the Six-Pack and
the Two-Pack, the effects of which were not only to increase the intensity of
the monitoring of budgetary plans, but also to ensure co-ordination among
member states before those plans were put to national parliaments. The Fiscal
Compact, the aim of which is to alter the institutional structure of domestic pol-
itical arrangements to prevent excessive deﬁcits from arising or rectify them as
quickly as possible if they do exist, reinforces these provisions. As contractarian
theory predicts, these devices emerge where previous commitment has been
shown wanting and there is no alternative to continuing collective association.
In other words, when commitments turned out not to be credible, the contrac-
tarian logic leads actors to a search for greater compliance by increased monitor-
ing, penalties and institutional restructuring (Weale forthcoming).
Does this contractarian rationale provide a justiﬁcation of the political legiti-
macy of EMU as it has been constructed? It could only do so provided that the
states in question could be regarded as unitary actors. Yet, treating states as
unitary actors is merely a simplifying assumption, useful for the purposes of
some types of analysis but distorting if taken as an accurate representation of
an empirical situation. States are collective entities made up of constellations
262 Journal of European Public Policy
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 of many actors. In political associations modelled according to the norms of
two-level games, the political representatives of each state simultaneously owe
obligations to the political representatives of other states and to their own popu-
lations (Savage and Weale 2009), with implications for their ability to comply
with their contractual commitments.
The credible commitment that each state has to be able to make to every other
concerns such matters as the maximum budget deﬁcits that they will allow in
their public spending plans, the rate at which deﬁcits will be rectiﬁed and the
balance between the growth of GDP and the growth of public expenditure.
However, the commitment of states with regard to these policy strategies can
only be made credible provided that each state enjoys the conﬁdence of its citi-
zens. Only with the conﬁdence of their citizens will these states possess the
capacity to implement the policies implied by the international agreement. In
the modern world, this conﬁdence and the resulting capacity to implement
policy rest upon democratic political legitimation. Monetary union implies,
then, that each state can have the conﬁdence that all other states can secure suf-
ﬁcient ongoing domestic support to meet their consequent obligations. Hence,
only if states enjoy democratic legitimacy will other states have reason to believe
that their commitments are credible.
A similar interlocking logic arises in the relationship of states to their citizens.
For international agreements to be credible, the governments responsible for
implementing them must be able to give domestic populations good reasons
for compliance, showing how an agreement will serve the collective interest.
At the same time, each state must recognize that all other states that are
parties to the agreement are similarly acting as representatives of their citizens.
The state parties are thus engaged in a two-level game, in which the terms of the
agreement have to be simultaneously acceptable to other negotiating parties and
to their domestic constituents. Simultaneity in this context does not mean
’occurring at the same time’, but indicates that any international agreement
must fulﬁl two sets of conditions. First, an international agreement requires
’fair dealing’ among states in their relations with one another as the representa-
tives of their peoples. Second, states must ensure the general acceptability of the
agreement to their respective peoples and be able to justify their international
commitments, including any provisions for side payments, as being a reasonable
way of advancing their joint and several common interests. Unless this second
condition is met, so that a state can guarantee the backing of the people it rep-
resents, no other state party to the putative contract can be conﬁdent that a com-
mitment made to it is credible.
In short, the logic of collective commitment in a monetary union presupposes
the logic of political democracy at the national level. Unless all the state parties
to an agreement possess a credible democracy at the national level, it is a prac-
tical contradiction at the international level for them to enter into commitments
with each other, since, in those circumstances, no state could rationally trust the
commitments of the other states or be trustworthy itself. Consequently, pace
certain analysts of the EU (Majone 2001; Scharpf 1999) input legitimacy at
R. Bellamy and A. Weale: Contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of
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 the domestic level cannot be substituted by output legitimacy at the inter-
national level – particularly if the beneﬁcial effects of those outputs vary over
time and between the different parties to the agreement in ways that might
be regarded as unfair (Bellamy [2010]; a point acknowledged by the post-
crisis analyses of Majone [2012] and Scharpf [2011]). Therefore, the search
for ‘an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe’ is in effect a search for cred-
ible commitment devices among the contracting member states in respect of the
peoples whom they represent (Bellamy 2013).
The need for domestic political legitimacy is not simply a political fact; it is
also a reason within a normative order. An international agreement involves
each state recognizing that all other states are embedded within a normative
order that governs their internal and external relations. Consequently, each
state requires democratic legitimation for its commitments. The most elabo-
rately worked out example of the logic of such a normative order is that pro-
vided by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence on
EMU starting with Brunner (Federal Constitutional Court 1993). That juris-
prudence recognizes that the German state needs to be able to enter into
long-term international commitments in order to be able to secure beneﬁts
that are only available through internationally co-ordinated action. At the
same time, the jurisprudence of the Court insists that any international commit-
ment must be consistent with those principles of the Basic Law that bind the
German state in perpetuity to the principle of democratic authority stemming
from the people. In particular, the voting rights of German citizens should not
be compromised by the German parliament losing meaningful control over the
direction of economic policy. Therefore, the Court has seen its task as being to
make it legally and constitutionally possible for the German state to enter into
and honour international agreements that are in its interests and in the interests
of other states who are party to the agreement, whilst at the same time retaining
the principle of the democratic self-determination of the German people that is
a fundamental element of the Basic Law. In a series of judgements, the Court
has reasoned that these different demands can be reconciled through the doc-
trine of delegation. So long as the international agreement could be said to
rest on the delegated authority of the member state and the Bundestag retained
the power of revoking Germany’s participation in the international agreement,
then the principle of democratic self-determination was respected.
As Gustavsson (1998) noted, the Court’s reasoning in Brunner rested upon
three assumptions about EMU: its revocability by the Bundestag; its marginality
in terms of the scope of obligations it implied; and its predictability. The sub-
sequent jurisprudence of the Court has had to deal with the failure of one or
more of these assumptions to obtain in practice. Thus, in a recent judgement
ontheconstitutionalityofthepolicyofOMTbytheECB(FederalConstitutional
Court 2014a), a majority of the judges ruled that OMT were unconstitutional,
because they involved an open-ended commitment by the German government.
Inotherwords,thescopeoftheobligationsimpliedbyOMTwasneitherlimited
norpredictable.AlthoughtheCourtreferredthemattertotheCourtofJusticeof
264 Journal of European Public Policy
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 the European Union, it offered its own (sceptical) interpretation of the compat-
ibility of the ECB’s planned action with treaty and constitutional requirements.
However, the kernel of its judgment turned on the force of Article 38 (1) of the
GermanBasicLaw.Inlinewithitspreviousjurisprudence,theCourtinterpreted
this Article as requiring that state authority could not be transferred to the extent
thatdemocraticcontrolbecomesnugatory.Therighttovoteisineffectdeﬁnedas
therighttovoteinanelectionwheretheresultwillleadtomeaningfulparliamen-
tarycontrolovertheconditionsofcollectivelife,therebyexpressingtheself-deter-
mination of the people. Democratic self-determination means that the scope of
the Bundestag’s authority cannot be rendered nugatory, and, if the German gov-
ernmentfailedtocontest thepolicyofOMT,thenitsactionscanberevoked (for
this logic, see also Lindseth [2010: 24]).
On many matters of international agreement, domestic acceptability can be
presumed by national decision-makers because the issues involved are technical,
have low political salience or can be negotiated with the agreement of speciﬁc
interest groups who share a consensus on which polices best serve their mutual
advantage.Inotherwords,theysatisfysomethinglikeamarginalityrequirement.
Prior to EMU, the EU’s competences largely concerned such low salient issues
and hence aroused comparatively little democratic contestation (Moravcsik
2002). However, the logic of monetary union does not fall into any of these cat-
egories. Although it is technical, its ramiﬁcations are wide. Few items are as pol-
itically salient as the reliability of a nation’s currency. And interest groups
typicallytakedifferentandincompatiblepositionsonthedesirabilityofdifferent
monetarypolicies.Inthesecircumstances,theassumptionthatstatesareactingas
authorized representatives of their populations will break down, unless there are
goodreasonsforthinkingthattheauthorizationisopen-ended(hencetheshiftin
thepost-crisisanalysesofScharpf[2011]andMajone[2012],which,unlikeMor-
avscik [2012], have moved close to the argument made here). However, as the
jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court shows, after 1993
no other state had reason to think that the authorization was open-ended in
the case of Germany. It was predictable that at some stage the limits of monetary
integration would be met. This line of argument can be generalized. For just as
other states had no reason for thinking that Germany would have an irrevocable
commitmenttoalltheimplicationsofEMU,sonooneinGermanycouldreason-
ably think that all other states could retain a democratic mandate for abiding by
the rules of EMU when those terms became unpredictably onerous.
The practical contradiction at the heart of EMU is that member states could
only ﬁnd the terms of the contract credible on condition that they could assume
that the commitments entered into by all other member states went beyond the
scope of democratic legitimation within those states. That the contradiction
revealed itself in the instability of the political contract on which EMU rested
arose in part from the predictable unpredictability of monetary union. That
feature in turn stemmed from the fallibility of political judgement within the
circumstances of politics, an element of the normative logic that we discuss in
the next section.
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 LIBERALISM VERSUS LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Legal constitutionalism of the sort that underlies the constitution of EMU
represents one tradition within the liberal inheritance, one that is notably
counter-majoritarian in its implications. According to that tradition, if
modern democracies have the characteristics attributed to them by neoliberal
legal constitutionalists, these commitments could not be credible, since the gov-
ernments of the same states that entered into the contract would be prone to
myopic and short-term sectional pressures such that they would take any oppor-
tunities that might arise to free ride on the co-operation of others. If the tempta-
tion to free ride is built into democratic governments in this way, then there is
no credible basis for commitment on the part of any potential party to the con-
tract. The only basis for a credible agreement on monetary union would be
through the general establishment of legal economic constitutions at the
national level, underpinned by powerful counter-majoritarian institutions, so
as to break the link between public expenditure and responsiveness to the pre-
ferences of the population. Of course, this proposal is an implication of the neo-
liberal legal constitutionalist analysis, and the ﬁrst steps along such a path are
embodied in the requirements of the TSCG.
However, counter-majoritarian legal constitutionalism in the economic realm
is only one way of reading the liberal inheritance. Indeed, that tradition is at
odds with another liberal idea: namely, the claim that any constitutional politi-
cal contract should recognize the ‘burdens of judgement’ in its construction
(Rawls 1996: 54–8). The burdens of judgement arise from such general features
of human judgement as the complexity of empirical evidence, the different
weight that different persons will put on different types of evidence, the vague-
ness of relevant concepts and the problems of assessing evidence. Given the
burdens of judgement, a constitution should refrain from imposing require-
ments on those subject to it that will be matters of reasonable disagreement,
matters, in other words, in which no knockdown arguments are possible.
Rawls used this argument to exclude the constitutional entrenchment of reli-
gious doctrines because they rested on controversial philosophical premises,
an issue that also arose in the convention on the putative EU constitution
(Olsen 2004). However, Rawls (1996: 225) also gives the example of disputed
‘elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium’ as involving inherently
controversial views that should not be given constitutional status. If one takes
this view of disputed economic theories, the fair value of political liberties
cannot be maintained if some views are given a privileged constitutional pos-
ition vis-a `-vis other views.
Does the entrenchment of a particular form of Hayekian theory in the con-
stitution of EMU fall foul of this condition? There are a number of reasons to
suppose that it does. Firstly, Hayek himself opposed EMU in part because he
recognized economic policy, even of a libertarian kind, was not a matter that
could be legally entrenched. Instead, he advocated free competition between
rival currencies provided by private rather than public banks (Hayek 1978).
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 Although this is a position that Issing (2000) attempted to contest on neo-Haye-
kian grounds, Hayek’s scepticism about EMU was a logical consequence of his
belief that viable economic orders were the evolutionary product of human
action but not of human design (Hayek 1979). In other words, the attempt
to construct an international monetary order by political ﬁat would replicate
the fallacies of central planning on which the road to serfdom was based.
Secondly, even within neoliberalism, there are other traditions of theory that
take a non-evolutionary view of the economic order. Although sometimes ident-
iﬁed with a Hayekian perspective, even by Hayek (1967: 252–3) himself on
some occasions, German ordoliberal economists like Eucken and Ro ¨pke, took
the view that a functioning economy presupposes a moment of constitutional
founding in which the rules of its operation are determined (Eucken [1951a,
1951b]; compare Goldschmidt [2000]; Nicholls [1994]; Peukert [2000]). As
various commentators (for example, Sally [1998]; Streit and Wohlgemuth
[2000]) have noted, this ordoliberal tradition contrasts with the Hayekian pos-
ition in being rationalist and constructivist. It presupposes that the institutional
form of the economy is determined within an already established legal order and
political community. Economic integration is not an instrument to create a pol-
itical community, but an expression of the political choices of that community.
Thirdly, this ordoliberal view is consistent with the worries many economists
and policy-makers had expressed about the sequencing of European political
union and monetary union and the design ﬂaws built into EMU before the
euro crisis had revealed these problems. For example, in a paper summarizing
a wide range of work, Bordo and Jonung (2003: 43–4) pointed out that
EMU lacked both a lender of last resort, by contrast with other modern mon-
etary systems where central banks were able to ensure liquidity, and a central
authority to supervize ﬁnancial systems, including the commercial banks.
They went on to point out that the absence of any central co-ordination of
ﬁscal policies within EMU combined with ‘unduly strict criteria for debt and
deﬁcits ...implies that EMU will not be able to respond to asymmetric
shocks and disturbances in a satisfactory way’. Finally, and as many other econ-
omists also noted, they pointed out that Europe is too large and diverse an area
to form a well-functioning currency union, with the efﬁciency gains from
increased trade not large enough to outweigh the costs of surrendering
control over national monetary policies.
Fourthly, it is well established that different national traditions of economic
policy-making fed into the creation of EMU. For reasons of history and intel-
lectual tradition, German policy-making gave pride of place to the goal of price
stability underpinned by the independence of the central bank. By contrast,
French thinking gave priority to gouvernement e ´conomique, a view of the
relationship between government and the economy in which executive action
played a large role in securing the day-to-day steering and co-ordination of
the economy, as well as providing capital for investment in major projects
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Jabko 2006: 168–72). Historically and institu-
tionally rooted traditions do not disappear in a new policy framework, but
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 manifest themselves in different ways. In particular, when it comes to questions
of how countries recover from largeeconomic shocks, there willbe differences in
what is seen as justiﬁable requirements; for example, how quickly and by what
methods to re-establish internationally credible debt levels within the frame-
work of the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure. Similar differences of judgement will
affect how countries think about the institutionalization of debt brakes and
other constitutional devices under the TSCG.
The implication of these points is that legal constitutionalism presupposes
that there can be agreement on the basis of the constitutional essentials of a
European monetary order, although the epistemic conditions do not exist to
establish that agreement. Indeed, even the German Bundesbank, so often pre-
sented as a model apolitical central bank, had its independence from the
German government tested both by Adenauer and Schmidt (Kennedy 1991:
37–42). If within a single country, with powerful political and intellectual tra-
ditions justifying a strong independent central bank, the issue can be contested,
it is not surprising that a rigid pan-European economic constitution based on
the idea of automatic rules will be contested even more.
POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
The argument so far may be summarized as follows: credible commitment by
governments at the international level presupposes political legitimacy at the
domestic level; but the domestic legitimacy of democratic governments in
turn presupposes that commitments may be modiﬁed or altered through politi-
cal processes. Moreover, the epistemic conditions arising from the burdens of
judgement reinforce the need for open discussion and democratic deliberation.
Legal constitutionalism at the international level, therefore, risks undermining
rather than reinforcing the credibility of state commitments if the measures
legally entrenched are matters that should be subject to ongoing political
debate by domestic electorates.
Political constitutionalism offers an alternative to legal constitutionalism
(Bellamy 2007). By contrast to legal constitutionalism, political constitutional-
ism contends the terms of the political contract must be subject to ongoing
debate among citizens with regard to both the procedures of decision-making
and the substance of decisions. Judgments about either cannot be legitimately
entrenched or handled by judicial or technical bodies that are isolated from
democratic processes because such isolation fails to recognize the equal legal
and political status of citizens. Political constitutionalists argue that the func-
tional complexity, ethical diversity and openness of liberal societies make indi-
vidual judgements about the public good inevitably partial and fallible. Because
we are inescapably limited in our knowledge and experience, even the most con-
scientious persons will tend to reason from their own values and interests and be
prone to error with regard to the present and future interests of others. If the
collective decisions needed to regulate social life are to be not only impartial
268 Journal of European Public Policy
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 but also well informed with regard to the views and circumstances of those to
whom they apply, so that they treat citizens with equal respect and concern,
then citizens must have equal inﬂuence and control over the direction of
public policy. Pace neoliberal thinkers, such as Hayek, such equal inﬂuence
and control cannot be provided by markets but only by a democratic process,
albeit indirectly through the election of decision-makers (Bellamy 1994).
Legal constitutionalism in its purest form tries to place the legal and political
systemitselfandevenmanypublicpoliciesbeyondpoliticalcontestation,deﬁning
insubstantiveandconcretetermshowbothmightbebestconﬁguredsoastorealize
equal concern and respect. By contrast, political constitutionalism in its purest
form regards legitimacyasdependent uponthe ability toemployexistingpolitical
procedures to contest the procedural and substantive adequacy of the democratic
system and its policies through the constant struggle of citizens to exercise equal
inﬂuence and control over both. Most liberal democracies combine different
degrees of each of them, some nearer to the political constitutionalist end of the
spectrum and others more at the legal constitutionalist end. The various
member states manifest considerable diversity in this respect, making all but the
most abstract and procedural forms of legal constitutionalism difﬁcult to agree.
Hence the need for political constitutionalism between even those member
states that have legal constitutionalist regimes (compare Glencross [2013]).
From the perspective of the normative logic oftwo-level games, the legitimacy
of the integration process depends on its taking the form of what might be
termed ‘republican inter-governmentalism’ (Bellamy 2013); that is, the govern-
ments and their agents can only enter into credible commitments with each
other to the extent that they possess ongoing democratic authorization to rep-
resent their respective peoples, and acknowledge the equal right and obligation
of all the other governments to represent their peoples (Pettit 2010). This logic
stands behind the largely consensual character of much EU decision-making,
not least the unanimity rule for any treaty change and the need for such
changes to obtain domestic ratiﬁcation within all 28 member states. Such fea-
tures have led a number of commentators to remark on how the EU is best
characterized not as a democracy, with EU citizens forming a pan-European
demos, but as a demoicracy between the different peoples of the member
states (Chevenal and Schimmelfennig 2013; Nicolaidis 2013).
We have argued that the legal constitutionalist mechanisms embodied in the
TSCG cannot provide EMU with political legitimacy of a normative kind. It is
not possible to model the choices of the actors according to the normative logic
of the two-level contract in such a way that their practical reasoning is credible.
If such reasoning cannot be modelled in acontractarian way in theory, it will not
be credible in practice. Instead, EMU must remain part of the political consti-
tution provided by the ongoing democratic inﬂuence and control of those
subject to it. Within the EU as presently constituted, this political constitution
must reﬂect the normative logic of two-level games. As such, political legitimacy
comes not from a single EU demos but from an agreement among the different
demoi of the eurozone, as negotiated by their elected representatives. For EMU
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 to be legitimate, therefore, it must be under the demoicratic control of European
states. The logic here is that of the delegation of authority, with the problem of
democratic legitimacy in the EU, not that of the democratic deﬁcit but that of
the democratic disconnect – the failure to ensure policy-making remains under
the equal inﬂuence and control of the constituted peoples of the Union via their
domestic democratic processes (Lindseth 2010: 234).
Can such demoicratic control be achieved in the case of a currency union? A
detailed response lies outside the scope of this contribution. Here, we wish
merely to indicate the institutional structures needed to place EMU under a pol-
iticalratherthanalegalconstitution,andtonotehowthesestructuresexistwithin
the EU to a sufﬁcient degree for this proposal to be plausible. The main lines of
such an approach can be found in the German Constitutional Court’s judge-
ments from 1993 onwards referred to earlier. According to the Court, the
national parliament, the Bundestag, as the representative body of the German
people, plays an integral role in realizing the ‘right to democracy’ guaranteed
by the German Constitution. Moreover, its budgetary responsibilities form an
intrinsicaspectofthatrole,giventhatdecisionsonrevenueandexpenditurecon-
strainthechoiceofpublicpoliciesthatshapethecollectivelifeofcitizens.Adopt-
ing reasoning that encapsulates both political constitutionalism and the
demoicratic approach, the Court has argued that ‘sufﬁcient space’ has to exist
for the citizens of the member state to be able to interpret the fundamental
rights that underlie their ‘economic, cultural and social living conditions’.
Given reasonable disagreements about the relative importance and nature of
theserightsandhowtheymightbebestinterpretedandrealized – disagreements
that have been resolved in different ways over time within each of the member
states, as their different political and constitutional traditions attest – European
uniﬁcationcouldnotbeconductedinsuchawayastoleavenospaceforthedemoi
of the contracting parties to determine their collective life according to their dif-
fering‘cultural,historicalandlinguisticperceptions’through‘publicdiscoursein
the party, political and parliamentary spheres of public politics’ (Federal Consti-
tutional Court 2009). As a result, the Court has insisted on the Bundestag’s right
of participation in ESM, particularly in authorizing extensions of the guarantees
for the fund (Federal Constitutional Court 2014b).
Drawing on this reasoning, two roles for national parliaments emerge within
EMU. The ﬁrst, domestic, role is to ensure that in negotiating budgetary rules at
the EU level, the elected executives of each of the contracting member states act
on the authority of their national parliament, and that the subsequent undertak-
ings remain subject to their control and scrutiny. There are signs that other
national parliaments are following the German lead. For example, Spain has
set up a parliamentary budget ofﬁce – the Oﬁcina Prespuestaria de las Cortes
Generales – that checks and assesses the execution of the budget and provides
information to the legislature. The French and Italian Parliaments have likewise
requested higher standards of information and transparency on issues of Euro-
pean economic governance. The second, inter-parliamentary, role involves
national parliaments working together to ensure that EU measures treat each
270 Journal of European Public Policy
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 of the member states with equal concern and respect as self-governing polities.
That role was developed formally with Lisbon and the measures relating to their
mutual guardianship of subsidiarity, such as the Early Warning Mechanism.
Such measures have increased the Commission’s obligation to inform and
give reasons to parliaments for their policies, while encouraging parliaments
to develop the requisite scrutiny and control procedures. Most importantly,
the role of national parliaments was explicitly acknowledged in Article 13 of
the TSCG, which provided the basis for the creation of the Interparliamentary
Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the European Union.
Although both these roles remain as yet rudimentary and untested, they are
the subject of considerable policy interest at present (see, for example House
of Lords [2014b]) and provide the beginnings of the sort of demoicratic political
constitution we have advocated for EMU.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the normative order of the EU requires that contracts
between member states be seen as a two-level game, in which executives can
only sign credible agreements as the duly authorized agents of their domestic
peoples. We termed this demoicratic structure ‘republican intergovernmental-
ism’. We argued that the attempt to view the neoliberal budgetary constraints
of the Fiscal Compact as a supranational legal constitution not only conﬂicted
with this normative order, but also was unjustiﬁable in denying the reasonable
disagreements among both citizens and member states about economic policy.
Instead, such measures have to be subject to a political constitution of a demoi-
cratic kind. The continuing role for national parliaments insisted on by the
German Constitutional Court in its Lisbon Judgment and elsewhere (Federal
Constitutional Court 2009) provide the basis for such a political constitutional
framework for EMU.
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